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learning about the physiology of the liver. 
The roots of our need for detachment and equanimity go back 
to Sir William Osler, but the pendulum has swung too far, and 
the need for retention of millions of data bits overwhelms our 
souls. Although excessive emotion is destructive and counter-
productive, we must not suppress our passion-but control it. 
The best physician both feels with the patient and prescribes for 
the patient at the same time. To do one without the other is 
inadequate care. As medical educators our task is clear. 
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Nonclinical Use of Medical Skills: 
Beneficence Lost? 
Kim Marie Thorburn MD 
The first time that I was asked to probe a rectum to search for 
sequestered drugs remains fresh in my memory. The correc-
tional lieutenant, commander of the watch, seemed more men-
acing than the convict suspect as I attempted to explain my 
refusal to participate. "Yes, I am employed by the prison, but I 
am a physician. My profession's code of ethics prevails."1•2 
It may have been the first demand to apply my medical skills 
to a body-cavity search but the issue of nonclinical use of 
medical skills was not new to me. The incident took place at San 
Quentin Prison, site of California's gas chamber. State regula-
tions call for doctors to pronounce cessation of vital signs during 
executions. Before accepting a position at the prison, I sought 
assurance that I would not be expected to work in the death 
chamber in the event of an execution. 
The ethical principle in these examples is beneficence. We 
physicians use our special skills for the good of our patients. 
It could be argued that there are times when our skills must be 
applied for the good of the community. Retrieval of sequestered 
drugs, for example, might benefit the prison community by 
preventing access to harmful substances, needle sharing and 
accumulation of debts. However, Jonsen et al argue that compet-
ing ethical responsibilities must be prioritized and the patient's 
medical interests receive greater weight than public good. 3 
Beneficence is grounded in a fundamental medical premise: 
The patient must trust the physician.4 The physician's skills 
signify life or death, health or illness; violation of the trust 
disrupts the patient-doctor relationship. The physician loses the 
opportunity to intervene and help the patient with his or her 
substance abuse, the opportunity for a potentially more sus-
tained benefit than a one-time interruption of drug trafficking. 
Doctors' involvement in executions might seem a clear-cut 
misuse of clinical skills. However, it was not until1980 that the 
American Medical Association resolved that physicians should 
not participate in executions.6 Most states that execute have 
-
statutory or regulatory requirements for physicians to be present.7 
Even after the AMA pronouncement, some pi)ysicians have 
argued there is a role for doctors at executions because the death 
penalty is legal. 8 
Determination of competence to be executed is still controver-
sial. The AMA awaits action by the American Psychiatric 
Association on whether it is prohibited participation in execu-
tions. In 1986, the United States Supreme Court decided that it 
is cruel and unusual punishment to execute condemned people 
who, because of mental illness, do not understand their wrong-
doing or the consequences of the penalty.9 (Prior to 1986, this 
was also customary law.) Psychiatrists are asked to render 
opinions on measures of competency, opinions that can contrib-
ute to the killing of the person whom they examined. 10 
One argument that favors psychiatrist involvement in 
competency-to-be-executed assessments (and other judicially 
mandated evaluations) is that forensic medicine is a bona fide 
field of specialty in which doctors do not have patients. Forensic 
psychiatrists and others serve important legal functions and 
work as objective experts for the courts and other quasi-legal 
entities. Beneficence is not an issue.U 
Could this be a slippery slope? 
What then about demands for application of medical skills in 
the interest of the military, a prison, or an industry?12' 13 The 
primary mission of these institutions is defense and war, deten-
tion and punishment, or manufacturing and production, not 
medical care of soldiers, prisoners, or workers. These institu-
tional missions could easily corrupt professional values if doc-
tors readily used their skills to serve military, prison, or indus-
trial purposes. 
Other demands for physicians' clinical skills are more insidi-
ous. Some may arise from the adversarial nature of the legal 
system. There is a tendency to cast many societal decisions as 
polar, an individual's needs against the public good. The medi-
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cal profession is sought to render opinions about an individual's 
needs. Disability assessments are an example. We are also 
involved in welfare decisions, child placements, insurance eli-
gibility and other situations in which we apply our skills for 
purposes other than to care for the patient. 12 
It is true that our assessment may help the individual, such as 
a truly needy patient who receives disability benefits. But it is 
also possible that we may contribute to a decision not to render 
benefits. Such a decision can be quite disruptive of the doctor-
patient relationship. The risk arises because these are nonclinical 
uses of medical skills-beneficence lost. 
The contemporary transformation of the delivery of medical 
care could further erode the principle ofbeneficence as a premier 
ethical premise of the medical profession. More and more, 
physicians are finding themselves in institutional relationships. 
In contrast to the prison or military or industrial physician, the 
institutions do not seem to be at cross-purposes with our profes-
sional mission. They are institutions, such as health mainte-
nance organizations and other managed-care entities, whose 
purpose is to organize health care for patients. Problems will 
arise because institutions serve groups. Physicians care for 
individuals. The principle ofbeneficence is more important than 
ever as a guide to our practice of medicine. 
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Consent for Children as Organ Donors 
Rodney W. Williams MD, JD 
The use of children as organ donors has been a source of legal 
and ethical concern since transplantation became generally 
available. 
Introduction 
The number of diseases in children successfully treated by bone 
marrow and solid organ transplantation continually increases. 
The availability of a histo-compatible minor sibling as a donor 
has raised ethical and legal issues since transplantation became 
available. Organ donation represents a significant risk to one 
child (the donor) while the benefit accrues to a second child (the 
recipient). Parents who decide for both children must deal with 
this conflict. 
St Francis Medical Center has devised a consent procedure 
that attempts to avoid parental conflict of interest, recognizes the 
emerging competency of the child donor, and provides a mea-
sure of protection for the donor. 
Reprints are available from the author: 
St Francis Medical Center 
2230 Liliha Street 
Honolulu, Hawaii 96817 
Sophie's Choice 
In Sophie's Choice, 1 a mother was forced to decide which of her 
two children would be killed in a Nazi concentration camp. 
Early commentators portrayed parental consent for their child's 
organ donation similarly, refusing to acknowledge that organ 
donors benefited from the donation: 
[T]he parents should not be allowed to deprive a child of one 
of his vital organs without his consent or his intelligent 
comprehension ... [l]t is considered almost impossible to 
support the view that parents should be allowed to consent 
to the removal of organs from minor children. Actually, 
legislation should be passed to prohibit children under a 
certain age from acting as donors. 2 
The Supreme Court of the United States in a different context 
has stated that while parents may be free to become martyrs 
themselves, it does not follow that they are free, in identical 
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they 
have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can 
make that choice for themselves.3 
Parents are given broad authority to enter into contracts for 
their children and to consent to medical treatment. Since organ 
donation is not medical treatment, however, consent should not 
extend to procedures such as organ donation where the benefit 
accrues to one child while the risk is borne by a second. Does the 
decision presented to the parents differ from Sophie's choice 
only in degree and not in kind? 
-
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